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THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A MANAGER OF GLOBAL ‘BUSINESS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS’ REGULATION: COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY REPORTING 
RULES 
Aleydis Nissen* 
 
Abstract: The European Union’s 2013 Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) rules bring within 
the public domain information on corporate payments made to governments all over the world 
for the purpose of exploiting natural resources in the oil, gas, mining and logging sectors. In so 
doing, the CBCR rules enhance transparency in these sectors and aim to reduce tax avoidance and 
corruption in resource-rich countries. Arguably, they also contribute to the European 
Commission’s long-term strategy to secure sustained access to raw materials in the European 
Economic Area. The CBCR rules represent one of the only three binding regulatory frameworks 
that have been adopted at the EU level to implement the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights. Just as with the two other initiatives that came into existence (the Non-
Financial Reporting Directive and the Conflict Minerals Regulation), the immediate impact on 
the competitiveness of corporations based in the EU was a key concern during the legislative 
process. This article uncovers the two strategies that were employed to overcome such concern 
and give the CBCR rules a ‘global’ character.  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Treaty of the European Union (TFEU) establishes that the European Union (EU) has 
the duty to promote human rights within the competences attributed by its Member States 
when it adopts and implements regulations as well as in its relations with the wider 
world.1 On this basis, the EU has taken a variety of actions to prevent and remedy human 
rights violations by corporate actors.2 However, it was the endorsement of the United 
Nations (UN) Guiding Principles by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011 that triggered 
the EU’s more formal and focused approach to ‘business and human rights’ issues.3 The 
 
1
 PhD student, School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University. Thanks to Lewis Graham, Urfan Khaliq, 
Joyman Lee, Shaun Matos, Andrew McLean, Steven Nam, Luminiţa Olteanu, Jiří Přibáň, Theo 
Raedschelders Sr and the reviewers. I would also like to use this opportunity to thank Joo-Young Lee and 
Stijn Smismans for their continued gratuitous support as well as Ludger Kühnhardt and Woo-Sik Moon for 
being so kind to host me at Bonn University’s Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung and Seoul 
National University’s EU Centre while I was researching this article. All mistakes remain my own.  
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/13, arts 2, 3(5) and 21(1). 
2
 Stephanie Bijlmakers, Mary Footer and Nicolas Hachez, ‘The EU’s Engagement with the Main Business 
and Human Rights Instruments’ (2015) <http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Deliverable-7.4.pdf> accessed 29 February 2018 50.  
3
 UNHRC, Res 17/4 (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4; EU Permanent Delegation to the UN Office and 
other International Organisations in Geneva, ‘Business and Human Rights – Human Rights Council 
Resolution 17/4’ (2012) D(2012) 703 034, 1; Commission, ‘Staff Working Document on Implementing the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - State of Play’ SWD (2015) 144 final 2. 
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UN Guiding Principles serve as the basis to foster consistency in multilateral as well as 
unilateral initiatives in which the EU is involved in the ‘business and human rights’ area.4  
A number of non-binding multilateral initiatives that have materialised following 
the adoption of the UN Guiding Principles were fully welcomed by the European 
Commission (Commission) and other EU institutions.5 These include the 2011 update of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines for 
Multinational Companies, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Accountability and Remedy Project and the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers 
Recommendation on Human Rights and Business.6 
The EU and its Member States also rely upon the UN Guiding Principles to justify 
not engaging constructively in the ongoing elaboration process on an international legally 
binding treaty at the UN Human Rights Council since 2014.7 While the UN Guiding 
Principles are applicable to all corporations, the treaty is predicted to have a more limited 
scope. Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/9, which triggered the treaty elaboration process, sets 
out that it would only be applicable to ‘transnational corporations and corporations that 
have a transnational character in their operational activities’.8 The EU has criticised the 
UN Working Group leading the treaty elaboration process because it has not facilitated a 
broad and constructive dialogue regarding the scope of application of the future treaty, 
 
4
 EU External Action Service, ‘2017 United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights – EU 
Contribution’ (2017) <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36353/2017-united-
nations-forum-business-and-human-rights-eu-contribution_en> accessed 11 February 2018. 
5
 For example, Commission (n 3) 21; European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the EU’s Priorities for the 
UNHRC Sessions in 2016’ (2016) 2015/3035(RSP) 27; Council of the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on EU 
Priorities at UN HR fora in 2017’ (2017) 5689/17, Annex para 27.  
6
 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Background Paper Accompanying Draft Guidance 
Prepared by OHCHR for the Purposes of Inclusion in its Final Report to the Human Rights Council pursuant 
to A/HRC/Res/22/26, para. 7’ (2015) <http://www.ioe-
emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Policy%20Areas/business_and_human_rights/EN/_2016-
02-22__C-362_OHCHR_Bus_Human_Rights_Accountability___Remedy_Project_-
_Background_Paper_to_draft_guidance__final_.pdf> accessed 24 March 2016; OECD, OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (2nd edn, OECD Publishing 2011); Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation of 
the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Human Rights and Business’ CM/Rec (2016) 3. 
7
 EU, ‘UN Human Rights Council 26th Session – Item 3 Resolution L.22, EU Explanation of Vote’ (2014) 
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/HRC_resolution_Explanation_of_vote_EU.pdf> 
accessed 11 November 2017.  
8
 UNHRC, Res 26/9 (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9.  
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including the meaning of ‘having a transnational character’.9 For this reason, the EU 
Member States voted en bloc against Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/9 alongside the US.10  
In so doing, the EU aimed to protect the competitiveness of EU-based 
corporations. It is indeed likely that the treaty would create an uneven playing field, which 
disadvantages EU-based corporations that operate in third countries where the domestic 
protection of human rights is weak. While the EU finally started engaging in the treaty 
elaboration process in 2016 under pressure from the European Parliament,11 the EU’s 
participation remains largely restrained.12 Most recently, at the fourth session of the 
Working Group in October 2018, the EU and its Member States were not prepared to 
exchange views with the civil society on how the future treaty could build on existing EU 
initiatives in the area of business and human rights. 
Bearing in mind these observations relating to the EU’s position in the ongoing 
treaty process, the question arises whether the EU has been able to mitigate the effects on 
the competitiveness of EU-based corporations in mandatory unilateral initiatives, which 
fit in with its approach to ‘business and human rights’ issues. To date, three EU regulatory 
frameworks have come into existence, which contribute to the implementation of the UN 
Guiding Principles.13 These are the sector-wide 2014 Non-Financial Reporting Directive 
and two regulatory frameworks that specifically target raw materials, the 2013 CBCR 
rules and the 2017 Conflict Minerals Regulation.14 
 
9
 European Parliament, ‘Research Initiative Towards a Binding International Treaty on Business and 
Human Rights’ (2018) PE 620.229 11.  
10
 EU, ‘UN Human Rights Council 26th Session – Item 3 Resolution L.22, EU Explanation of Vote’ (2014) 
<https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/HRC_resolution_Explanation_of_vote_EU.pdf> 
accessed 11 February 2018. See Nicole Tuttle, ‘Human Rights Council Resolutions 26/9 and 26/22: 
Towards Corporate Accountability’ (2015) 19 American Society of International Law Insights 
<https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/20/human-rights-council-resolutions-269-and-2622-
towards-corporate> accessed 5 February 2016. 
11
 European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 21 January 2016 on the EU’s Priorities for the UNHRC Sessions in 
2016’ (2015) 2015/3035(RSP) para 28; European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 14 December 2016 on the 
Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World and the European Union's policy on the 
matter 2015’ (2016) 2016/2219(INI) para 84; European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 25 October 2016 on 
Corporate liability for Serious Human Rights Abuses in Third Countries’ (2016) 2015/2315(INI) para 12. 
12
 European Parliament, ‘Research Initiative Towards a Binding International Treaty on Business and 
Human Rights’ (2018) PE 620.229, 11. 
13
 As noted in Commission (n 3) 10; EU External Action Service, ‘2016 United Nations Forum on Business 
and Human Rights – Contribution of the European Union’ (2016) 
<https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/14906/2016-united-nations-forum-business-
and-human-rights-contribution-european-union_en> accessed 11 February 2018; EU External Action 
Service (n 4).  
14
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 Amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large 
Undertakings and Groups Text with EEA relevance [2014] OJ L330/1 (Directive 2014/95/EU); Directive 
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They have been coordinated through the Commission's Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) Strategy. The 2011-2014 CSR Strategy is the Commission’s first 
Strategy in which it has stated that mandatory regulation might be needed in order to 
make CSR an integral part of corporations’ core strategic thinking.15 To this end, a new 
definition of CSR, consistent with the UN Guiding Principles (and other CSR principles 
and guidelines), has been set out by the Commission. Accordingly, CSR is understood as 
‘the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society’.16 More specifically, the 
Commission indicated that ‘a smart mix of voluntary policy measures and, where 
necessary, complementary regulation’ would be required to implement CSR, including 
‘business and human rights’ measures.17 This new approach can be considered a major 
change, even though the main responsibility to implement the Commission’s CSR 
Strategy is attributed to corporations. Up until 2011, the Commission’s CSR strategy 
provided a full-blown ‘business case’ which assumed that there would be sufficient 
incentives for corporations to adopt CSR measures voluntarily. CSR had previously been 
defined in the Commission’s 2001 Green Paper as ‘a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’.18 This proposition had been 
justified by the Commission based on the argument that a strategic approach to human 
 
2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and 
Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings, Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with 
EEA Relevance [2013] OJ L182/19 (Directive 2013/34/EU) art 51; Directive 2004/109/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
Information about Issuers whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market [2004] OJ 
L390/38 amended by art 1 Directive 2013/50/EU European Parliament and Council Directive 2013/50/EU 
of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers whose 
Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are Offered to the Public 
or Admitted to Trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC Laying down Detailed Rules for the 
Implementation of Certain Provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC Text with EEA relevance [2013] OJ 
L294/13 (Directive 2004/109/EC amended by art 6 Directive 2013/50/EU); European Parliament and 
Council Regulation 2017/821 of 17 May 2017 Laying down Supply Chain Due Diligence Obligations for 
Union Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, their Ores, and Gold Originating from Conflict-Affected 
and High Risk Areas [2017] OJ L130/1. 
15
 Commission, ‘A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2011) COM 
(2011) 0681 final 5; EU External Action Service (n 4).  
16
 Commission (n 15) 6.  
17
 ibid 10. 
18
 Commission, ‘Green Paper - Promoting a European framework for CSR’ (Communication) COM (2001) 
366 final 20. 
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rights can result in a range of long-term benefits for corporations including a more 
committed workforce and a better reputation.19 
This shift in favour of binding CSR rules makes the Commission’s approach to 
CSR more congruent with the approach of the European Parliament. The latter body has 
pressured the Commission for decades to take binding CSR measures. In the 1990s, it 
noted already that ‘codes of conduct must not be used as instruments for putting 
multinational enterprises beyond the scope of governmental and judicial scrutiny’.20 
Corporations are indeed, in many instances, reluctant to implement voluntarily CSR 
measures, including those relating to human rights. While there is some room for 
differentiation regarding the impact of respecting or disrespecting CSR on the 
competitive advantage of corporations, investing in CSR capabilities generally does not 
‘pay off’ immediately. Business organisational behaviour, therefore, tends to be rigid and 
resistant to change. The impact assessment of the 2014 Non-Financial Reporting 
Directive aptly noted in this regard that ‘the benefits related to non-financial disclosure 
are often perceived as long-term and uncertain, while short-term costs are relatively high 
and easily measurable’.21 
Through an in-depth investigation of a wide variety of documents of the relevant 
EU bodies and national actors, this article uncovers how the EU has handled concerns 
about competitiveness by giving the unilateral initiatives which fit in with its approach to 
‘business and human rights’ issues a ‘global’ character. Due to space limitations, the 
analysis will focus mainly on the Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) rules.  
The article is organised as follows. Section B describes the CBCR rules. Section 
C sets out why this unilateral initiative has been prioritised within the EU’s approach to 
‘business and human rights’ issues. It is argued that this initiative fits within the EU’s 
long-term interests, which became a major concern after the 2007 global financial crisis. 
Section D discusses the scope of the CBCR rules and, in so doing, sets out the first 
 
19
 ibid para 24. 
20
 European Parliament, Resolution on EU standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing 
Countries: Towards a European Code of Conduct of 14 April 1999 [1999] OJ C 104 180 recital F. See Jan 
Wouters and Leen Chanet, ‘Corporate Human Rights Responsibility: A European Perspective’ (2008) 6(2) 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 272-83 for an overview of such calls by the European 
Parliament.  
21
 Commission, ‘Staff Working Document Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment Accompanying 
the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information 
by Certain Large Companies and Groups’ SWD (2013) 0128 final 2.1. 
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strategy used by the EU to give the CBCR rules a ‘global’ character. It highlights that the 
CBCR rules are applicable to certain categories of corporations based outside the 
European Economic Area (EEA). Section E discusses a second strategy that has been 
employed by the EU to give the CBCR rules a ‘global’ character. In particular, it shows 
that the EU aims to empower the multilateral Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), which requests governments to publish the revenues actually received 
from corporations. It is further highlighted that, in achieving this goal, the EU attempts 
to bypass national governments. The final section F concludes and refers to the Conflict 
Minerals Regulation and the Non-Financial Reporting Directive.  
 
B. THE EU’S CBCR RULES 
The CBCR rules bring within the public domain information on corporate payments made 
to governments all over the world for exploiting natural resources in the extractive – oil, 
gas, mining – or logging (of primary forest) sectors. Certain corporations, which are 
active in these sectors, are required to disclose the total amount of annual corporate 
payments to each government all over the world and the projects concerned. In particular, 
they have to disclose their material payments to governments passing a de minimis 
threshold of EUR 100,000 within a financial year for national resources in a separate 
report on an annual basis.22 This regime includes not only taxes on income, production 
and profits but also other payments to governments such as royalties and payments for 
infrastructure improvements.23 The payments need to be broken down according to their 
type, on a country-by-country and project-by-project basis.24 The operational activities 
that are governed by a single contract, licence, lease, concession or a similar legal 
agreement and form the basis for payment liabilities to a government are defined as one 
project.25 If multiple agreements are substantially interconnected, then they will also be 
considered as one project. While such a definition is open to interpretation, 26 activities 
 
22
 Arts 42-44 Directive 2013/34/EU. 
23
 Other payments that fall under the CBCR rules are production entitlements, royalties, dividends paid in 
lieu of such entitlements and royalties, signature, discovery and production bonuses, rental fees, entry fees 
and other considerations for licences and/or concessions. Taxes levied on consumption such as value added 
taxes, personal income taxes or sales taxes and dividends that have been paid to a government as a common 
or ordinary shareholders on the same terms as other shareholders do not need to be reported (Recital 48, 
arts 42(1) and 41(5) Directive 2013/34/EU). 
24
 Art 43(2) Directive 2013/34/EU. 
25
 ibid art 41(4).  
26 This makes it difficult to compare country-by-country reports. See Lucas Porsch and others, ‘Study: 
Review of country-by-country reporting requirements for extractive and logging industries’ (2018) 
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that would otherwise fall under the Directive may not be re-characterised, artificially split 
or aggregated with a view to eluding the CBCR requirements according to the preamble.27  
The information on payments needs to be made publicly available to all 
stakeholders through either the stock market information repository or the business 
registry in the same way as financial statements are made available. A copy of the whole 
or any part of the country-by-country report must be obtainable on application.28 The 
responsible bodies of a corporation such as the board of directors and C-level executives 
need to ensure that, to the best of their ability and knowledge, the report on payments to 
governments is drawn up and published.29 In case of non-compliance, national competent 
authorities or courts are entitled to impose fines.30 These penalties must be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.  
 
C. THE EU’S GOALS AND INTERESTS 
The legal basis of the CBCR rules is article 50 of the TFEU. This article sets out that the 
EU and its Member States share the competence to install necessary safeguards to protect 
shareholders and other stakeholders in order to attain the freedom of establishment of 
corporations within Member States.31 The protection of shareholders under article 50 
TFEU has often been used as a basis to legitimise harmonising measures which enhance 
transparency and legal certainty in financial information. Shareholders need information 
such as the identity of other shareholders and the size of their shareholdings in order to 
make substantiated and well-conceived investment decisions.32 Relying upon this article 
to harmonise non-financial measures is, however, relatively new.33 It was the European 
 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/181126-country-by-country-reporting-extractive-logging-
industries-study_en> accessed 26 June 2019 27-28. 
27
 Recital 49 Directive 2013/34/EU.  
28
 ibid art 45(1). 
29
 ibid art 45(2).  
30
 ibid art 51; Art 6 Directive 2004/109 EC (amended by art 1 Directive 2013/50/EU). 
31
 Arts 50(1) and 50(2)(g) TFEU. 
32
 See Karsten Engsig Sørensen, ‘Shareholders’ Duty to Disclose’ in Hanne Birkmose, Shareholders’ 
Duties (Wolters Kluwer 2017) 307-08. 
33
 Art 50 TFEU had also been used as a basis to adopt the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, one of the 
three other binding EU regulatory frameworks that implement the UN Guiding Principles.  This Directive 
encourages long-term shareholder engagement. Sustainable finance became a strategic priority for the 
Commission in the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis, which had a profound impact on the 
Eurozone. Institutional investors and asset managers were found to have supported market volatility and 
systemic risk by failing to account for material non-financial issues (such as respect for human rights). See 
European Commission, European Parliament, Council, European Economic and Social Committee and 
Committee of the Regions, ‘Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance – a Modern 
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Parliament that acknowledged the importance of corporations divulging CSR information 
with a view to identifying risks and increasing stakeholder trust in two separate 2013 
Resolutions.34  
The CBCR rules aim to improve the transparency of payments made to 
governments by oil, gas, mining and logging corporations.35 The trade in natural 
resources is often the cause or catalysing factor in conflicts in resource-rich countries.36 
Potential revenues generated from these scarce resources are an important source of 
income for financing activities of governments, armed groups and security forces. The 
desire for control over natural resources is often accompanied by struggles over power, 
influence and related issues such as access to land and questions of identity and 
citizenship. For this reason, access to natural resources can be said to be inseparable from 
violence, corruption and human rights violations.37 
The CBCR rules can indirectly provide affected populations of resource-rich 
countries with information regarding transactions of natural resources. The disclosed 
information might help citizens and civil society organisations in resource-rich countries 
to evaluate whether receipts from exploitation of natural resources deliver adequate value 
to them and to demand such value from their government if the evaluation returns a 
negative result (provided that they have the freedom to do so).38 Increased public scrutiny 
and engagement can contribute to disseminating the information available and can 
provide clearer expectations concerning its materiality and completeness. This can, in 
 
Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies’ (2012) COM/2012/0740 
final.  
34
 Recital 3 Directive 2014/95/EU referring to the European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 6 February 2013 
on Corporate Social Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent and Responsible Business Behaviour and 
Sustainable Growth’ (2013) 2012/2098(INI) and to European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 6 February 2013 
on Corporate Social Responsibility: Promoting Society's Interests and a Route to Sustainable and Inclusive 
Recovery’ (2013) 2012/2097(INI).  
35
 EU, ‘Public Country-by-Country Reporting’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/public-country-country-reporting_en> accessed 
11 September 2018.  
36
 For a comprehensive review of the literature on the ‘resource curse’ see Jeffrey Frankel, ‘The Natural 
Resource Curse: a Survey’ (2010) NBER Working Paper Series <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15836.pdf> 
accessed 11 September 2018.  
37
 European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 26 February 2014 on Promoting Development through Responsible 
Business Practices, including the Role of Extractive Industries in Developing Countries’ (2014) 
2013/2126(INI), 43.  
38
 Commission, ‘Staff Working Document Impact Assessment for Financial Disclosures on a Country-by-
Country Basis Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Council Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency 
Requirements and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Annual 
Financial Statements, consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of 
Undertakings’ SEC (2011) 1289 final 34.  
The European Union as a Manager of Global ‘Business and Human Rights’ Regulation 
149 
turn, lead to the development of comprehensive valuation models, including corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights.39 Increased public scrutiny can also, in the long 
run, encourage shareholders to assess and account appropriately for all the risks and 
externalities of firms.40  
 Over the years, the EU has often presented itself as a ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ 
power which prioritises the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights over self-interests.41 Such ‘power’ 
has been used by the EU to create a ‘sense of common responsibility and structures of 
contractual politics’ between state actors in international affairs.42 Manners argues that 
this was a way for the EU to legitimise and present itself as more than ‘merely’ a form of 
economic government in response to the increasing resistance by its citizens to economic 
liberalisation after the Cold War.43 However, the robustness and coherence of this identity 
in EU’s relations with the wider world has been extensively criticised in the literature.44 
It has been determined by now that the EU’s normative interests are often subjugated to 
or influenced by its economic interests and other strategic interests such as regional 
stability and its geopolitical and commercial gain.45  
The Commission indicated in its 2011-2014 CSR Strategy that the following three 
‘business and human rights’ issues would require mandatory measures: to promote 
transparency; to create market incentives for responsible business conduct and to ensure 
corporate accountability.46 The Commission promised to share specific priorities 
regarding its ‘business and human rights’ agenda by the end of 2012.47 Yet, the Council 
 
39
 Recital 3 Directive 2014/95/EU. 
40
 European Commission (n 21) 6.1.4. See European Parliament and Council Directive 2017/828 of 17 May 
2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder 
Engagement [2017] OJ L 132/1, 2. 
41
 François Dûchene, ‘The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence’ in Max 
Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager, A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European 
Community (Palgrave Macmillan 1973) 1, 19-21; Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction 
in Terms’ (2002) 40(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 235, 244. 
42
 Dûchene (n 41).  
43
 Manners (n 41) 244. 
44
 For example, Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique’ (2006) 13(2) J.E.P.P. 
217; Lena Partzch, ‘The New EU Conflict Minerals Regulation: Normative Power in International 
Relations’ (2018) Global Policy 479. 
45 There exists a rich literature on this topic. For example, Chad Damro, ‘Market power Europe’ (2012) 
19(5) J.E.P.P. 682; Erik Oddvar Eriksen, ‘The EU – a Cosmopolitan Polity?’ (2006) 13(2) J.E.P.P. 252.  
46
 Commission (n 15) 5; EU External Action Service (n 4). 
47
 Commission (n 15) title 4.8.2 paras 11 and 12.  
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of the EU correctly established that such priorities have not been communicated.48 The 
Council and the European Parliament have requested to put a number of other issues on 
the ‘business and human rights’ agenda, including responsible global value chains, child 
labour and access to civil judicial remedies.49 To date, these requests have been ignored 
by the Commission.  
A likely reason for prioritising the CBCR rules within EU’s approach to ‘business 
and human rights’ issues is that the normative interests at stake coincide with the strategic 
goal to secure access to raw materials. The CBCR rules and their impact assessment 
support this hypothesis. They refer to the need to secure access to oil and gas as well as 
EU’s ‘Forest Law Enforcement and the Governance and Trade’ (FLEGT) Action Plan.50 
On the one hand, securing access to oil and gas under the same conditions as industry 
competitors became a priority for the Commission after the disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 left six EU Member States – which depended on Russia as the 
single external supplier for their gas supply – with severe shortages.51 On the other hand, 
the FLEGT Action Plan implements a licensing scheme designed to guarantee that only 
legally harvested timber from partner countries that agree to take part in this scheme enter 
the EU. It is part of EU’s Raw Materials Initiative, adopted in 2008 with a view to 
promoting access to non-energy materials that are crucial to the long-term sound 
functioning of EU industries, and hence to economic growth and jobs in the long run.52 
The supply risks in the EU are mainly caused by resource concentration in combination 
with political and economic instability in a number of resource-rich countries. These risks 
are compounded by low substitutability in the EU and the rise of East and South Asian 
economies. 
 
D. A GLOBAL CHARACTER: EXTENSIVE SCOPE 
 
48
 Council of the EU, ‘Council conclusions on the Action plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-
2019’ (2015) 10897/15 action 18b.  
49
 For example, Council of the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on Child Labour’ (2016) 10244/16; Council of 
the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on Responsible Global Value chains’ (2016) 8833/16; Council of the EU, 
‘Conclusions on Business and Human Rights of 20 June 2016’ (2016) 10254/16 para 12, 15 and 26; 
European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 21 January 2016 on the EU’s Priorities for the UNHRC Sessions in 
2016’ (2016) 2015/3035(RSP) para 27 
50
 Recitals 44 and 52 Directive 2013/34/EU; Recital 7 Directive 2013/50/EU and Commission (n 38) 40 
referring to the European Commission, ‘Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) – 
Proposal for an EU Action Plan’ COM (2003) 0251 final.  
51
 Commission, ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ COM (2014) 330 final 2.  
52
 Commission, ‘The Raw Materials Initiative Meeting Our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs in Europe’ 
COM (2008) 699 final 5. 
The European Union as a Manager of Global ‘Business and Human Rights’ Regulation 
151 
The CBCR rules fit into global efforts to regulate the exploitation of raw materials by 
corporate actors. Prior to EU’s efforts, the United States (US) had already presented itself 
as a norm innovator in the regulation of raw materials. Under the Obama Administration, 
the US had questioned the international ‘status quo’ through the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (US Dodd-Frank Act). Section 1504 of this 
Act required corporations, including non-US corporations, operating in the ‘commercial 
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals’ which have securities listed on US stock 
exchanges to publicly report payments to governments
 
on a country- and project-specific 
basis. 53 At the time, President Obama’s Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy 
and the Environment at the State Department Catherine Novelli wrote that this legal 
requirement would allow the US to strengthen its credibility and ability to fight 
corruption.54 
Both the EU and the US have tried to give their regulations a ‘global’ character 
by defining the scope of their rules in an extensive way. Just as section 1504 of the US 
Dodd-Frank Act is applicable to US listed corporations, EU’s CBCR rules cover a broad 
scope. The CBCR rules are applicable to corporations which are listed on EEA regulated 
markets even if they are not incorporated under the laws of an EEA Member State. To 
this end, both the Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU and the Transparency Directive 
2004/109 EC were changed.55 All corporations listed in the EEA, regardless of where 
they are incorporated, would have to comply with CBCR rules. For example, the China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) – which has been simultaneously listed on 
the Hong Kong, New York and London Stock Exchanges – has to comply with section 
1504 of the US Dodd-Frank Act and EU’s CBCR rules.  
 
53
 Commission (n 38) 10-11. Stock exchanges are also increasingly setting standards for risk management. 
The UK Alternative Investment Market – a non-regulated stock market for smaller enterprises within the 
London Stock Exchange – and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s Growth Market Enterprises have created 
CBCR obligations for new applicants that operate in the extractive sector See Commission (n 38). The 
London Metal Exchange is now considering to require copper-cobalt producers which source copper-cobalt 
from the DR Congo to carry out independent audits to prove their material is ethically sourced following 
its own investigation regarding the use by listed Chinese electronics corporations of copper-cobalt extracted 
from Congolese mines that use child labour (Lokin-Sassen in Nederland (Eerste Kamer der Staten 
Generaal) Dossier 34506 (19) Handelingen 19 December 2017, EK 2017-2018, 13, 
<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/34506/h-ek-20172018-13-
19?resultIndex=2&sorttype=1&sortorder=4> accessed 14 April 2018; Henry Sanderson, ‘LME to 
strengthen scrutiny of DRC-sourced cobalt’ Financial Times (2 July 2018) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/efe02b92-7b7f-11e8-8e67-1e1a0846c475> accessed 2 February 2018). 
54 Department of State Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment (US), ‘Letter 
to Mary Jo White, US Securities and Exchange Commission 21 January 2016’ 
<https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-15/s72515-13.pdf> accessed 27 June 2019 1. 
55
 Art 42(1) Directive 2013/34/EU; Art 6 Directive 2004/109 EC (amended by art 1 Directive 2013/50/EU). 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
152 
While section 1504 of the US Dodd-Frank Act is only applicable to listed 
corporations, EU’s CBCR rules also cover ‘large’ unlisted corporations in the EEA that 
pass a de minimis average threshold of 500 employees and either a balance sheet total of 
over EUR 20 million or a net turnover of over EUR 40 million during the relevant 
financial year. 56 Corporations listed in the EEA successfully lobbied to extend the CBCR 
rules to large unlisted corporations registered in the EEA in order to ensure a level playing 
field on which listed and unlisted corporations share the same regulatory burden. It was 
reasoned that unlisted corporations also engage in cross-border activities and operate in 
countries other than their country of registration through subsidiaries, associates, joint 
ventures and branches. Not requiring CBCR information of unlisted corporations 
registered in the EEA might make it less attractive to be listed. This might have the 
consequence that less additional capital can be raised which might, in turn, become 
detrimental for economic growth and job creation.  
This broadly defined scope can also indirectly affect unlisted companies 
headquartered in third countries. This is because any large subsidiaries of unlisted (and 
other) companies with legal personality in the EEA are subject to the reporting obligation 
on their behalf. Excluded from the CBCR rules are non-EEA corporations that have no 
large subsidiaries with legal personality in the EEA (and which are not listed in the EEA). 
This was a key concern during the legislative process. The Danish Minister of Economic 
and Business Affairs Brian Mikkelsen stressed in this regard that: ‘Any possible 
regulation should be done globally – partly to achieve the wanted effect, partly to protect 
against unfair competition.’57 Two specific issues – which have previously also been 
raised in the US – were noted.58 First, the risk that there may be instances when 
commercially sensitive company information would be deduced from CBCR data was 
raised, including information on levels of turnover, pricing, costs and profit structure in a 
 
56
 Arts 3(4), 42(1) and 42(2) Directive 2013/34/EU; Commission (n 38) 5-6. 
57
 Ministry for Economic and Business Affairs (Denmark), ‘Letter to European Commission 22 December 
2010. Questionnaire: Country-by-Country Reporting by Multinational Companies’ 
<http://www.regnskabsmail.dk/oldsite/Lovgivning/Udvalgsbilag/2010-11/ERU%20bilag%20103.pdf> 
accessed 9 November 2017. 
58
 Michel Barnier (in his capacity as Commissioner for Internal Market and Services), ‘The EU 
Transparency and Accounting Directives’ (2014) 7(1) Journal of World Energy Law and Business 16, 17. 
See US SEC, ‘Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers’ (2016) 
<https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78167.pdf> accessed 28 June 2019 111-13. 
The European Union as a Manager of Global ‘Business and Human Rights’ Regulation 
153 
third country.59 Second, the risk that EU corporations would no longer qualify as contract 
partners for governments around the world was considered troublesome. 
It would be extremely controversial if the EU were to impose externally applicable 
rules on non-EU corporations that do not have a proximate connection with the EU. 
Instead, the Commission downplayed the two risks to which corporations that fall under 
the CBCR rules are exposed. Regarding the first issue, the impact assessment sets out that 
payments to governments represent only one element of a corporation’s operating cost 
base.60 This seems to be correct and finds support in the fact that country-by-country 
reports do not need to be audited under the CBCR rules.61 There remains, however, a 
reasonable risk that project-level disclosure can result in disclosure of commercially 
sensitive information provided in respect of individual mines and oil fields if a 
corporation has only one project in a country.62 Second, it was considered that the risk 
that EU corporations would lose contracts would be negligible because they possess a 
number of unique qualities – such as engineering know-how and technical efficiency – 
that corporations based in economically developing and emerging countries do not have.63 
For example, while state-owned oil corporations in these countries far outnumber EU and 
US privately-owned corporations when measured in ownership of reserves, the latter 
group is far ahead in terms of capital expenditure.64 
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A number of extractive industry corporations displayed a constructive attitude 
during the drafting process of the CBCR rules.65 The reason seems to be that this industry 
is characterised by long project cycles, which are coupled with great uncertainty regarding 
resource prices and project output. Increased transparency acts as a safeguard against 
reopening negotiations or expulsion after investments have been made in the research-
rich countries where they operate.66 In turn, it also makes the conversations regarding the 
contributions – including local infrastructure improvements – that corporate payments 
make to these countries clearer. In comparison, the logging industry was more vocal 
against the CBCR rules.67 Two reasons can explain the difference in attitude. First, section 
1504 of the US Dodd-Frank Act does not cover corporate activities related to the logging 
of primary forests. Competitors that are listed in the US (but not in the EU) do not have 
to disclose payments on a CBCR basis. Second – and more importantly – most logging 
corporations that fall under the CBCR rules are not listed and are smaller than extractive 
industry corporations are. Competitors of unlisted EU logging corporations are more 
likely to escape the CBCR rules as they are less likely to have subsidiaries with legal 
personality in the EEA.68 The effect is further amplified because logging corporations are 
generally less specialised than extractive industry corporations are.  
However, it comes as no surprise that the EU has included the logging of primary 
forests in the CBCR rules. The CBCR rules regarding logging complements a number of 
other initiatives which have been taken in the framework of the FLEGT Action Plan, 
including the Timber Regulation which requires traders of timber products to exercise 
due diligence in order to prevent illegal wood from entering into the EU market.69 The 
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EU has taken a leadership role in international environmental politics since the early 
1990s to protect the general interests of the whole of Europe and, by extension, the global 
common good. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in-depth the reasons why 
the EU has taken up a leadership role in environmental matters.70 It suffices to note here 
that the EU’s interest in global compliance in environmental matters is much more direct 
than in human rights matters, due to the interdependency of environmental regimes. 71  
 
E. A GLOBAL CHARACTER: EMPOWERING THE EITI 
Apart from defining the scope of the CBCR rules in an extensive way, the EU used 
another strategy to give them a ‘global’ character. The impact assessment stated that the 
combined effect of the EU and the US rules would have a major impact on corporations 
falling outside the CBCR rules (including state-owned corporations in economically 
developing and emerging countries).72Strengthening multilateral initiatives would 
ultimately reduce any negative effects vis-à-vis the competitive situation with EEA-based 
corporations. 73 The EU relies on two multilateral institutions to achieve these goals.  
First, the EU plans to contribute to the ‘continued work’ of the development of an 
International Standard by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).74 The 
IASB is a private sector organisation established in 1973 that has become the most widely 
recognised international financial reporting standard-setter in the world as 166 countries 
either permit or require the use of its standards. The development of an accounting 
standard for extractive industries by the IASB has been slow. The EU aims to get CBCR 
on the agenda of the IASB, despite the fact that the IASB stated that CBCR is not within 
the scope of accounting regulation in its 2006 project on company segmental reporting.75 
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Second, the CBCR rules would serve as an incentive to extend EITI’s scope to all 
resource-rich countries.76 The EITI is a multilateral initiative that promotes revenue 
transparency in oil, gas, mining (and logging) sectors in order to reduce tax avoidance 
and corruption in the extractive sector. It brings together stakeholders from government, 
civil society, investors and corporations into a national multi-stakeholder group, 
requesting governments to publish the revenues effectively received from corporations 
with activities in exploration and production in extractive activities (and logging).77 While 
the EITI is a voluntary initiative, participation in the process is mandatory for all 
extractive sector operators (including state-owned enterprises) once a country has 
endorsed the initiative, thereby creating a level playing field for all extractive operators. 
As many resource-rich countries were reluctant to join the EITI, the Commission found 
it necessary to ‘accelerate’ the process by which payments to governments in developing 
resource-rich countries would be characterised as falling into the public domain.78 It noted 
that in 2011, eight years after the EITI initiative had started, only nine out of fifty 
countries designated as resource-rich had joined the EITI. Some top exporters of 
hydrocarbons such as Algeria, Angola and Venezuela were not EITI-compliant or 
candidate countries. Only one country, Liberia, opted to extend the EITI to the logging 
sector at the time.79 The Commission predicted that the significant increase in the total 
level of data on payments to governments entering the public domain by the 
complementary efforts of the US and the EU would put pressure on governments of 
resource-rich countries to account for how all revenues derived from extractive activities 
and logging of primary forests have been spent.  
While the CBCR rules empower the EITI, they also go further than the EITI in 
two respects. According to the impact assessment, the CBCR rules were more adequate 
than the EITI as governments cannot easily strip them of their impact. First, governments 
do not decide on the materiality level for reporting payments or company participation 
under the CBCR rules. Under the EITI, governments can autonomously decide on the 
size of payment or the threshold size of company operations below which they are 
excluded from the process for reasons of cost/benefit. Second, the obligation to publish 
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all information does not ultimately lie with governments, but with corporations under the 
CBCR rules. While corporations have to provide fully disaggregated statements that 
apply international auditing standards under the EITI, the government can opt to publish 
the data in an aggregated form in the public EITI report. The conclusion that the 
Commission wanted to have a definite say in how country-by-country reporting should 
happen is further supported by the fact that establishing a multilateral framework was not 
seen as an option as it ‘would be the result of negotiation and compromise between the 
EU and its international partners, and the outcome of such negotiations would be difficult 
to foresee’.80  
The presented findings fit with the body of research on the use of ‘extraterritorial 
extension’ mechanisms by the EU in response to the 2007 global financial crisis, which 
had such a profound impact on the Eurozone.81 In order to increase integrity and 
transparency of financial markets, the EU regulated conduct taking place outside its 
borders but which is connected with its territory. It has been proposed that, in so doing, 
the EU exercises its regulatory power to develop the institutional architecture of 
international organisations and to determine the extent and terms of global governance.82 
Prior to establishing rules with an extraterritorial component which fit with its ‘business 
and human rights’ policy, the EU took measures in other areas, such as animal welfare, 
data protection and the environment. It is useful to give another example of 
‘extraterritorial extension’ mechanisms here. EU Regulation 421/2014 imposed a 
temporary scheme, which ran from 2013 to 2016 for greenhouse gas emissions from 
commercial aviation activities.83 While this Regulation was not generally applicable to 
aircrafts registered in non-EU countries and flying over third countries or the high seas, 
emission allowances for the full trajectory of flights which arrived at or departed from an 
aerodrome situated in the territory of an EU Member State needed to be monitored, 
reported and surrendered, including for the parts of the flight above the high seas and in 
the airspace of non-EU countries. This Regulation had the explicit ambition to combat 
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climate change by securing a future international agreement to control emissions from 
aviation by 2020.84 In particular, it aimed to empower the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) to adopt specific measures to control international aviation 
emissions. 
While the compatibility of autonomous measures with an extraterritorial 
component with international law has not been definitively proclaimed, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) considers such rules to be consistent with 
customary international law. The CJEU weighed in on this issue in the Air Transport 
Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 
case (ATAA case) which was brought by a number of American airlines in relation to 
Regulation 421/2014.85 It held that situations in which there is some territorial link with 
EU Member States fall squarely within EU’s jurisdiction.86 It is worth quoting in full the 
relevant paragraph of this judgment:  
[T]he European Union legislature may in principle choose to permit a commercial 
activity, in this instance air transport, to be carried out in the territory of the 
European Union only on condition that operators comply with the criteria that 
have been established by the European Union and are designed to fulfil the 
environmental protection objectives which it has set for itself, in particular where 
those objectives follow on from an international agreement to which the European 
Union is a signatory.87 
Regulation 421/2014 was not well received by other countries. The US issued a 
blocking legislation preventing US-based airlines from participating in the EU Scheme 
and China threatened to stop its agreements with the European Aeronautic Defence and 
Space Company.88 In response, the EU adopted a ‘stop the clock’ Regulation to 
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temporarily suspend Regulation 421/2014 under the condition that a multilateral solution 
to address emissions from aviation would be found within ICAO by the end of 2016.89 
The ICAO adopted the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International 
Aviation (CORSIA) in 2016.90 It thus appears that the EU has succeeded in securing a 
multilateral agreement. However, this agreement turned out not to be as stringent as the 
EU might have hoped.91 The CORSIA will only apply to emissions growth and not to 
existing emission levels. In addition, the CORSIA has yet to establish a system of 
sanctions for non-compliance and enforcement criteria. There has been some debate 
between the EU institutions about what an appropriate reaction to the CORSIA would be. 
Ultimately, a new Regulation was adopted in the 2017 which gives the ICAO more time 
(until the end of 2021) to issue stricter measures.  
The ATAA case illustrates that the EU can try to accommodate changes in the 
global rulemaking landscape, but must respect substantive limits. Unilateral rule-making 
denies the reality of different experiences and needs in other countries. Criticisms of neo-
colonialism, interference in other countries’ sovereignty and protectionism are apposite. 
In addition, EU’s global efforts continually interact with the strategies of other 
countries.92 
The exercise of extraterritorial extensions as proclaimed in the CBCR rules could 
have been controversial if other countries had regarded it as interference against their 
sovereign right to regulate corporations within their own borders and to pursue their own 
economic, social and cultural interests.93 However, they did not raise major problems, as 
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the US had already adopted a regulation which required corporations listed in the US to 
begin country-by-country reporting in 2019 under section 1504 of the US Dodd-Frank 
Act. It is also worth noting in this regard that the Commission itself claimed that the 
CBCR rules would ‘only be a breach of other states national sovereignty where disclosure 
of payments is prohibited by local laws in third states’.94 Following an intervention of the 
European Parliament, the proposed exemption to only require that the name of countries 
having criminal anti-disclosure in place would be disclosed – instead of CBCR payments 
– has also been deleted.95 The European Parliament deemed that such exemption would 
protect tyrants and, therefore, overshoot the objective of the CBCR rules.96  
The current situation is very different. Although the US Dodd-Frank Act became 
law in 2010 under the Obama Administration, the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (US SEC) could implement Section 1504’s disclosure provisions only in 
2016.97 Rule 240.13q-1 would have required most corporations to begin disclosing 
payments in 2019. However, on 14 February 2017, the Republican-controlled US 
Congress removed this Rule in a joint resolution that was signed by President Trump 
under the Congressional Review Act.98 Removing the CBCR obligation is part of the 
Trump Administration’s efforts to reduce the regulatory burden facing corporations. In a 
statement, it was explained that Rule 240.13q-1:  
[…] would impose unreasonable compliance costs on American energy 
companies that are not justified by quantifiable benefits. Moreover, American 
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businesses could face a competitive disadvantage in cases where their foreign 
competitors are not subject to similar rules.99  
The US rules will be re-drafted by the US SEC under Section 1504 of the US Dodd-Frank 
Act, but it is likely that its replacement will meet the same standard, as the Trump 
Administration has vowed to protect commercially sensitive information as well as 
governments that prohibit disclosure of their projects.100 Note that Rule 240.13q-1 (d) 
already allowed US listed corporations to apply for ‘exemptive relief’ when governments 
prohibit the publication of country-by-country reports. The US SEC had adopted this rule 
in response to a lawsuit that had been brought by the American Petroleum Institute in the 
US District Court for the District of Columbia.101  
Regardless of what will happen next in the US, country-by-country reporting 
seems to be here to stay. It appears that the EU has been successful in creating CBCR 
rules, which do not have an overly negative impact on EU based corporations. Three 
observations support this hypothesis. First, Norway and Canada have adopted CBCR 
obligations that resemble EU’s initiative.102 Second, the number of countries that have 
joined the EITI has increased significantly. At the time of the impact assessment in 2011, 
only nine out of the fifty countries considered hydrocarbon or mineral-rich by the 
International Monetary Fund were EITI compliant. Today, more than thirty of these are 
compliant with the 2011 version of the EITI. Third, European extractive companies have 
not reported that they suffer material damages or losses of opportunities due to the 
introduction of the CBCR requirements according to the 2018 review of the CBCR rules 
which has been conducted at the request of the Commission.103  
 
99
 Donald Trump, ‘Statement of Administration Policy: H.J. Res. 38, H.J. Res. 36, H.J. Res. 41, H.J. Res. 
40, & H.J. Res. 37’ (2017) <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123145> accessed 6 July 2018. 
100
 ibid.  
101
 American Petroleum Institute v US SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C., 2013); US SEC, ‘Disclosure of 
Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers’ (2016) <https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78167.pdf> 
accessed 28 June 2019 202.  
102
 Forskrift om Land-For-Land Rapportering 2013 (NO); Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act 
2014 (CA). Note that the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and 
Exporters - a subordinate unit of the Ministry of Commerce of China - issued the Guidelines for Social 
Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments. While these Guidelines are not binding, they have been 
recognised as a major commitment of the Chinese government. See for example Peter Dolega and Doris 
Schüler, ‘European Policy Brief. China’s Approach Towards Responsible Sourcing’ (2018) 
<http://stradeproject.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/STRADE_PB_03_2018_China_responsible_sourcing.
pdf> accessed 27 June 2019 3, 6; Audrey Weerts, Sophie Wintgens and Jean Claude Mputu, ‘Les Strategies 
Americaine, Européenne et Chinoise Face aux Minerals des Conflits: Défis ou Opportunités pour la RDC?’ 
(2014-2015) L’Afrique des Grands Lacs 195, 206-07.  
103
 Porsch and others (n 26) 13. 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
162 
It is, however, also likely that the EU will not further strengthen its CBCR rules 
in the oil, gas, mining and logging sector in the immediate future by, for example, 
imposing a mandatory audit.104 Fortunately, some EU Member States – such as Belgium 
– require such an audit when they transposed the CBCR rules into national law.105 It can 
be predicted that these EU Member States will be supporters of similarly strict obligations 
in the EEA. The creation of a level playing field in the EEA would enable states to make 
sure that their respective corporate nationals would not suffer (perceived and real) short-
term corporate disadvantages vis-à-vis other EEA Member States. Callaghan refers to 
such support as a ‘constrain-thy-neighbour’ effect.106  
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This article has identified a tension between long-term and short-term economic EU 
interests. In the long run, EU-based corporations might benefit from ‘business and human 
rights’ regulation to secure access to energy resources and critical raw materials which 
are needed to innovate value propositions. The emerging economies of China and India 
are seen as a particular threat as they emerged as major buyers of energy resources and 
critical raw materials, a trend which has accelerated in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. In the short run, ‘business and human rights’ regulation might, however, 
have an immediate impact on the competitiveness of corporations based in the EEA. 
Mirroring legal developments in the US, the EU ultimately decided to take a long-term 
approach while attempting to minimise the impact on the competitiveness of corporations 
based in the EEA. The EU minimised such impact by giving the CBCR rules a ‘global’ 
character. The CBCR rules require all large oil, mining, minerals and logging 
corporations listed in the EEA - even if they are not incorporated under the laws of an 
EEA Member State - to report on payments made to governments regardless of their place 
of incorporation. In so doing, the EU has tried to strengthen the EITI while at the same 
time having a definite say as to how country-by-country reporting should happen on a 
global scale.  
A similar analysis can be conducted for the other sector-specific regulation which 
contributes to the EU’s ‘business and human rights’ policy, the Conflict Minerals 
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Regulation. This Regulation requires EU-based importers of the largest volumes of ores 
and concentrates containing tin, tantalum, titanium and gold – scarce materials on which 
EU Member States are highly dependent to innovate product value chains – to exercise 
due diligence over their suppliers in conflict-affected and high risk areas outside the 
EU.107 Smelters and refiners in non-EU countries are not de jure bound but they will be 
de facto bound if they want to continue their business relationships with EU-based 
importers. In this case, the EU relies on its market power as a relatively large importer of 
minerals – accounting for one-third of global trade volumes – to strengthen the OECD 
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from conflict-
affected and high-risk areas while at the same time having a definite say on how these 
industries should function.108 
Finally, it is worth noting that the EU was not able to overcome competitiveness 
concerns in the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, the only sector-wide initiative which 
contributes to EU’s ‘business and human rights’ policy. A number of EU Member States 
that had already taken similar legislation at the national level pushed this Directive. 
Although Commissioner Michel Barnier noted that the Commission tried to include ‘large 
companies listed in EU-regulated markets, but registered in Third World countries’ in the 
scope of this Directive,109 this option was ultimately not retained.110 Instead, the 
Commission made ‘substantial efforts to ensure that the administrative burden on EU 
companies was kept as minimal as possible’.111 The Directive does not determine key 
performance indicators nor auditing obligations.  
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